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I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission envisioned Item 303 of the
Securities Act and Exchange Act regulations, referred to as Management's
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A),* as a means to elicit and to improve
corporate communication with the public concerning what has already occurred
* B.S.B.A., The Ohio State University 1983; M.B.A., Texas A&M University Graduate
School of Business 1986; J.D., magna cum laude, University of Pittsburgh School of Law 1992;
LL.M.: Corporation Law, New York University School of Law 1993; C.P.A.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1993); see also Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed. Reg.
22,427 (May 18, 1989) [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 6835] (providing interpretive
guidance of the disclosure required by Item 303).
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and what lies ahead financially for public companies (registrants).2 However,
compliance with the federal securities disclosure laws is an arduous task for
public companies even under the best of circumstances. Under Item 303 and
its applicable interpretive releases, the MD&A disclosure requirements are
open-ended and exceedingly complex. An encounter with the disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws has been aptly described as
analogous to "a fencing match conducted on a tightrope."3 On one hand,
failure to comply with Item 303 may subject the registrant to the wrath of the
Commission4 and perhaps expose the registrant to other potential sources of
liability.5  On the other hand, unabridged MD&A disclosure may be
2. See, e.g, Securities Act Release No. 6711, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,118 (Apr. 20, 1987) (presenting detailed summary of MD&A's origins and the
evolution of the SEC's approach to the disclosure requirements of public companies) [hereinafter
Securities Act Release No. 6711]; see also Ray Garrett, Jr., Address before the Chicago Chapter
of American Society of Corporate Secretaries (Mar. 13, 1974) (the former SEC Chairman noting
that the Commission had adopted a hands-off approach to "free writing" communications with
shareholders); Carl W. Schneider, MD&A Disclosure, REV. SEC. & CoMMoDImEs REG., Aug.
23, 1989, at 149 (discussing requirements of MD&A and the resulting possibility of increased
liability).
3. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977).
4. The SEC has broad investigatory and remedial powers. The Commission's enforcement
powers include bringing suit in federal district court to enjoin violations of the securities laws,
referring violations of the securities laws to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution, and
instituting administrative proceedings to require compliance through cease and desist orders nd
monetary penalties. See 15 U.S.C. § 77u-v (1988).
5. While a comprehensive analysis of possible sources of corporate liability for violations of
the federal securities laws is beyond the scope of this article, a limited discussion is in order.
In general, registrants view periodic SEC filings as liability documents, because such filings are
routinely incorporated by reference into proxies, registration statements, and other informational
filings. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-23, 230.411, 201.24 (1993). When a person relies on
documents filed with the Commission in connection with a purchase or sale of securities, the
Exchange Act provides a private remedy for false of misleading statements contained within such
documents. See Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988). Section 78n makes it
unlawful to solicit a proxy in violation of any SEC rules or regulation. See id. § 78n. One such
rule' is 14a-9, which prohibits proxy solicitations that contain false statements or material
omissions. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1993). Further, the omnipresent Rule lob-5 general anti-
fraud provision prohibits the use of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities. See Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
Additionally, Section 20 of the Exchange Act imposes joint and several liability on controlling
persons for any violations by persons under their control. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988). Sections
11, 12, and 17 of the Securities Act also impose liability for violations in connection with a
purchase or sale of securities. Section 11 creates civil liability when a registration statement
contains an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission of a material fact. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k (1988). Section 12(1) imposes liability on persons selling securities without an effective
registration statement, while Section 12(2) imposes civil lability on a seller for misrepresentations
in a prospectus or oral communication. See 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988). A general prohibition
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imprudent or even detrimental to the best interests of the corporation and its
shareholders.
This article considers the more salient issues that the MD&A disclosure
requirements raise and reviews recent MD&A litigation. Part I discusses the
evolution of MD&A from its inception in 1968 to its current form. Part II
focuses on the registrant's duty to disclose material non-public information and
the requisite materiality standard of MD&A. In particular, this Part compares
the Basic Inc. v. Levinson6 probability/magnitude materiality balancing test
with the approach the Commission adopted in Securities Act Release No.
6835. 7 Part III explores the paradoxical distinction between required MD&A
prospective disclosure and voluntary forward-looking statements, as well as the
role, if any, that Rule 175's8 safe-harbor provisions play with elective Item
303 disclosure. To underscore the dilemma registrants and their legal counsel
face, Part IV engages in an extensive analysis of the statutory language of Item
303. Specifically, this section discusses the MD&A disclosure requirements
regarding liquidity, capital resources, results of operations, seg-
ment/subdivision, line item, and interim reporting. Part V examines the
response, or more appropriately the lack thereof, to MD&A by the accounting
profession and the self-regulating organizations. Finally, the last section
considers recent litigation involving MD&A, focusing specifically on a recent
and enlightening administrative proceeding the SEC brought against Caterpil-
lar, Inc.9
II. THE ORIGINS OF MD&A
The inception of MD&A lies in the SEC's 1968 adoption of the Guides
for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements. ° The Guides directed
that persons subject to the Securities Act of 193311 disclose in a summary of
earnings any unusual conditions affecting those earnings and footnote any
adverse changes "in operating results subsequent to the latest period included
in the summary of earnings."' 2
In 1974 the Commission expanded the guidelines 3 to encompass
6. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
7. See supra note 1.
8. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1993).
9. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532 (In re. Caterpillar Inc.) [1992 Transfer Binder] 7 Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,830 (March 31, 1992) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 30,532].
10. Securities Act Release No. 4936, 33 Fed. Reg. 18,617 (Dec. 9, 1968) [hereinafter
Securities Act Release No. 4936].
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa ((1988) & Supps. II-IV 1990-92).
12. Securities Act Release No. 4936, supra note 10, at 18,620.
13. Securities Act Release No. 5520, 39 Fed. Reg. 31,894 (Aug. 14, 1974) [hereinafter
Securities Act Release No. 5520].
1994] 1479
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required filings under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4 Devised to
enable investors and other users to better understand a registrant's earnings
summary, the new guidelines also mandated an extensive narrative explanation
of the summary. 5 The Commission intended "to enable investors to compare
periodic results of operation and to assess the source and probability of [the]
recurrence of earnings (losses). " 16 The 1974 guidelines adopted percentage
tests to help registrants discern which items of revenue and expense merited
discussion. 7 However, the Commission cautioned that some items not
meeting the percentage tests would still require discussion and analysis if such
were necessary to understand the summary. 8
Skyrocketing inflation and upwardly-spiraling interest rates marked the
late 1970s. The Commission soon realized that the narrow focus of the 1974
guidelines, coupled with the economic climate and the tendency of registrants
to apply the percentage tests in a mechanical fashion, resulted in the sought
after disclosure becoming nearly worthless.' 9 Responding to the perceived
inadequacies of the existing guidelines, the Commission revamped MD&A in
1980.20 The new guidelines emphasized the concepts of "materiality" and
"relevance."21 The new rules were flexible and drafted to preclude "boiler-
plate" discussions.'
The Commission issued its final promulgation of MD&A in 1989 with
Interpretive Release No. 6835, entitled Management's Discussion andAnalysis
14. Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1988) &
Supps. I-IV 1989-92).
15. Securities Act Release No. 5520, supra note 13, at 31,895. The separate discussion and
analysis was required to address the "(1) material changes from period to period in the amounts
of the items of revenues and expenses, and (2) changes in accounting principles or practices or
in the method of their application that have a material effect on net income as reported." Id.;
see also Securities Act Release No. 6711, supra note 2, at 88,623-624 (reaffirming the
usefulness of the guidelines provided in Act Release No. 5520).
16. Securities Act Release No. 5520, supra note 13, at 31,895.
17. Id. at 31,896 The percentage tests compelled disclosure when an item of revenue or
expense changed by more than ten percent from the previous period or when the average net
income or loss for the three most recent periods changed by more than two percent. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Securities Act Release No. 6231, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 25, 1980).
20. Id.
21. See id. at 63,636.
22. Id. The Commission rescinded the percentage tests and encouraged forward-looking
statements. Moreover, for the first time, the 1980 revised MD&A required the discussion of
favorable or unfavorable trends, material events, or uncertainties as they related to a registrant's
liquidity, capital resources, and results of operations. Id. Further, in 1981 the Commission
announced it would monitor the MD&A of registrants and issued examples of several registrants'
MD&As without passing on their merit. See Securities Act Release No. 6349, 23 SEC Docket
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of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company
Disclosures.3  Today, both Item 303 and Interpretive Release No. 6835
govern MD&A Disclosure. Regarding the aim of Item 303 and the Interpre-
tive Release, the Commission remarked:
In preparing MD&A disclosure, registrants should be guided by the
general purpose of the MD&A requirements: to give investors an
opportunity to look at the registrant through the eyes of management by
providing a historical and prospective analysis of the registrant's financial
condition and results of operations, with particular emphasis on the
registrant's prospects for the future. The MD&A requirements are
intentionally flexible and general. Because no two registrants are identical,
good MD&A disclosure for one registrant is not necessarily good MD&A
disclosure for another. The same is true for MD&A disclosure of the
same registrant in different years. The flexibility of MD&A creates a
framework for providing the marketplace with appropriate information
concerning the registrant's financial condition, changes in financial
condition and results of operation. 24
Apparently, the intent of both Item 303 and the Release is to emphasize the
quality, not the quantity of disclosure.'
III. THE MD&A DUTY TO DISCLOSE AND ITS
UNIQUE MATERIALITY STANDARD
It is now a well-settled principle of law that a duty to disclose material
information does not arise unless a disclosure "trigger" exists.26 The
situations that principally trigger an obligation to disclose material non-public
23. Securities Release Act No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,427.
24. Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,436.
25. See, e.g., Terry Lloyd & Vincent J. Love, Management's Discussion and Analysis, in
Understanding Financial Statements 1992: Accounting for Lawyers - A Corporate Law and
Practice Course Handbook (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7000,
1992).
26. The mere possession of non-public market information does not give rise to a duty to
disclose. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). There is also no general
obligationto disclose non-publicmaterial information. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
239 n.17 (1988) (Under the federal securities laws, "[slilence absent a duty to disclose, is not
misleading . . . ."). "The established view is that a 'duty to speak' must exist before the
disclosure of material facts is required... ." Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772.F.2d 231, 238
(6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986) (emphasis added). If a registrant voluntarily
chooses to reveal material information "even though there it had no duty to do so, it must
disclose the whole truth." Grossman v. Waste Management, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 395, 409 (N.D.
I11. 1984) (citing First Virginia Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978)).
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information occur when a registrant has made "inaccurate, incomplete, or
misleading prior disclosure;" when a registrant has made an accurate prior
disclosure which has remained alive, thereby creating a duty to correct or
update that disclosure in light of new material events; when a statute or
regulation requires disclosure; or when an insider trades on or misuses such
information.27 Hence, Item 303 is clearly a disclosure trigger; however, the
inquiry does not stop at this juncture. Only "material" non-public information
need be disclosed in the face of an established duty to disclose.
In general, for information to be material, "there must be a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact[s] would have been viewed
by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of
information made available."2" In other words, the information "is material
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [investor or other user]
would consider it important [in making an investment decision]."29 In the
context of preliminary merger negotiations, the Supreme Court in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson" endorsed a probability/magnitude balancing test.', The Basic
test of materiality depends upon the probability that the event will occur and
the significance of the event to the registrant.
32
However, in announcing the materiality standard for MD&A disclosure,
the Commission declared that "[t]he probability/magnitude test for materiality
approved by the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson . . .is inapposite
to Item 303 disclosure. "3 In Securities Act Release No. 6835, the Commis-
sion set forth the requirement that registrants apply the following two-prong
materiality test when management knows of a trend, demand, commitment,
event or uncertainty:
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty
likely to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not
27. See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 18-20 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Bownes,
J., dissenting) (citing Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1987)).
28. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
29. Id.
30. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
31. Id. at 231-32, 249. Post-Basic cases applying the probability/magnitude test include:
Taylor v. First Union Corp., 857 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 108
(1989); Jackvony v. RIHT Financial Corp., 873 F.2d 411, 415 (1st Cir. 1989).
32. Basic, 485 U.S. at 250. To assess the probability that an event will occur, the registrant
is required to evaluate the indicia of interest in the event at the highest levels within the
corporation. Id. at 239. In the potential merger context, the Court noted that such indicia would
include, but not be limited to, board resolutions, discussions with investment bankers, and actual
negotiations between principals or their agents. Id. Likewise, to assess the magnitude of the
event to the registrant, a consideration may be necessary of the size of the merging entities, the
amount of a potential premium over market value, or other particular factors. Id.
33. Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,430 n.27.
[Vol. 45:477
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reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required.
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate
objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand, commitment,
event or uncertainty, on the assumption that it will come to fruition.
Disclosure is then required unless management determines that a material
effect on the registrant's financial condition or results of operations is not
reasonably likely to occur.34
There may be trends, demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties for
which the probability of an occurrence is relatively low (not reasonably likely
to occur), but for which there may be a significant impact on the registrant.
Consequently, under the Basic probability/magnitude balancing test, the
information might be "material" and require disclosure; however, MD&A
would not dictate disclosure until the trend, demand, commitment, event, or
uncertainty appeared "reasonably likely to occur.
" 31
IV. PROSPECTIVE DISCLOSURE
Prior to the 1970s, the Commission's approach to MD&A was to
discourage predictive statements and to focus primarily on historical informa-
tion, on the theory that although soft information36 was inherently unreliable,
the public might give it undue credence. 37  For example, the Commission
believed that predictions of dividend estimates, expected earnings forecasts,
34. Id. at 22,430.
35. See id.; see also infra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the "reasonably likely
to occur" standard).
36. One respected commentator defines soft information as:
(1) forward-looking statements concerning the future, such as projections,
forecasts, predictions, and statements concerning plans and expectations;
(2) statements concerning past or present situations when the maker of the
statement lacks the data necessary to prove its accuracy...
(3) information based primarily on subjective evaluations...
(4) statements of motive, purpose, or intention... ;
(5) statements involving qualifying words.., for which there are no generally
accepted objective standards of measurement ....
Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254,
255 (1972).
37. See, e.g. Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 703, 707-09 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987) (discussing the historical development of the Commission's
position and the various circuits' approaches to soft information and predictive statements); South
Coast Serv. Corp. v. Santa Ana Valley Irrigation Co., 669 F.2d 1265, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982)
(discussing the policy rationale for the disclosure of soft information); see also Securities Act
Release No. 5180, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,506 (1971) (stating that required disclosure at a time when
an offering is in process or being contemplated must be accomplished in a manner that does not
unduly influence the proposed offering) [hereinafter Securities Act Release No. 5180].
1994]
7
Croft: MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
484 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:477
and future market values of a registrant's securities were particularly
misleading.3" Courts and commentators roundly criticized the Commission's
position,39 and in 1976, the Commission responded to that criticism by
deleting earnings projections from the list of potentially misleading disclosure
items.' By 1978 the Commission had completely reversed its earlier
position by encouraging registrants to include forward-looking statements in
their filings.41 One year later, the Commission enacted Rule 175, a safe-
harbor rule for prospective information statements, to coax registrants to
voluntarily disclose predictions in periodic filings.42 Rule 175 protects
registrants from liability under the federal securities laws for fraudulent
statement when the prospective or "forward-looking"43 statements are made
in good faith and based on reasonable assumptions."
MD&A presents many instances that call for the disclosure of prospective
information.45 However, the oxymoronic language of Item 303 has generated
38. Securities Act Release No. 5180, supra note 37, at 16,507.
39. See Walker, 802 F.2d at 707; see also 1 THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAw OF SECURITIES
REGULATION, 118-20 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing the Commission's policy and perspective, and
some leading commentator's criticisms of the Commission's perspective on soft information);
Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, 2 Securities Fraud and Commodities Fraud, § 6.5
(431)(3), at 136.123 (1992).
40. See Securities Act Release No. 5699, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
80,461 (Apr. 23, 1976).
41. See Securities Act Release No. 5993, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,251 (Nov. 7, 1978).
42. See Securities Act Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1993); see also Securities Act Release
No. 6084, [1979 transfer binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117 (July 30, 1979) (discussing
the background and purpose of the safe harbour rule).
43. Rule 175 defines forward-looking statements to mean:
(1) A statement containing a projection of revenues, income (loss), earnings
(loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure or other fimancial
items;
(2) A statement of management's plans and objectives for future operations;
(3) A statement of future economic performance contained in management's
discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations included
pursuant to Item 303 of Regulation S-K ... ; or
(4) Disclosed statements of the assumptions underlying or relating to any of the
statements described .... [by the three sections above].
Securities Exchange Act Rule 175(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(c) (1993).
44. 17 C.F.R. 230.175(a). Courts have placed the burden of proof as to "reasonable basis"
and "good faith" on the party challenging their existence. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison
Co., 892 F.2d 509, 513 (7th Cir. 1989); In re VeriFone Securities Litigation, 784 F. Supp. 1471,
1480 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, No. 92-15156, 1993 WL 469265 (9th Cir. 1993).
45. For example, a registrant's liquidity discussion must address "any known trends...
demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that will result in or that are reasonably likely to
result in . . ." material changes. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (1993); see also infra notes 60-71
and accompanying text (discussing liquidity). With respect to capital resources, MD&A calls for
the disclosure of "any known material trends, favorable or unfavorable . . . ." 17 C.F.R.
§ 303(a)(2)(ii); see also infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing capital resources).
8
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great consternation for registrants and their legal counsel. The phrases
"known trend" and "known uncertainties" used throughout Item 303 are
examples of such antithetical, incongruous terms. Item 303's instructions
regarding predictive information disclosure are inconsistent. One instruction
states that "[r]egistrants are encouraged, but not required, to supply forward-
looking information."46 The next sentence in that same instruction states that
forward-looking statements should be distinguished from presently known data
that will have a future impact on the registrant's future operating results or
financial condition. Notwithstanding the instruction to Item 303 that the
disclosure of predictive information is volitional and not compulsory, a
registrant may be obligated to disclose forward-looking information in certain
situations. The Commission attempted to shed some light on this subject in
Securities Act Release No. 6835, which states:
Both required disclosure regarding the future impact of presently
known trends, events or uncertainties and optional forward-looking
information may involve some prediction or projection. The distinction
between the two rests with the nature of the prediction required. Required
disclosure is based on currently known trends, events, and uncertainties
that are reasonably expected to have material effects.... In contrast,
optional forward-looking disclosure involves anticipating a future trend or
event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known event, trend or
uncertainty.47
Former SEC Commissioner and current adjunct professor of law at the
New York University School of Law, Edward H. Fleischman, has opined that,
for purposes of MD&A, "reasonably likely [or expected]" suggests a
likelihood of about forty percent. Unfortunately, this suggestion is far from
a bright-line rule and is of little solace to anxious registrants. The paradox
Regarding results of operations, Item 303 compels registrants to describe "any known trends or
uncertainties... reasonably [expected to]... have a material favorable or unfavorable impact
on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations." 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii);
see also infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text (discussing results of operations). Instruction
3 to Item 303 imparts the general requirement that MD&A "shall focus specifically on material
events and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported financial information
not to be necessarily indicative of future operating results or of future financial condition." 17
C.F.R. § 229.303(a) Instruction 3.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) Instruction 7 (1993).
47. Securities Act Release No 6835, supra note 1, at 22,429 (quoting the "Concept Release,"
Securities Act Release No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13715, 13717 (Apr. 20, 1987)).
48. Edward H. Fleischman, The Intersectionof Business Needs and Disclosure Requirements:
MD&A, Address before the Eleventh Annual Southern Securities Institute (Mar. 1, 1991). Mr.
Fleischman's comments were directed towards the MD&A materiality standard. However, one
may assume that the forty percent range notion would have equal application to the disclosure of
predictive information question as well.
1994]
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between prospective optional disclosure and required disclosure has engen-
dered much controversy and will likely continue to do so in the foreseeable
future.49
Rightfully, many registrants fear potential fraudulent misstatement or
omission liability if a prediction of financial results or future conditions in a
forward-looking statement do not materialize. Registrants are also concerned
when they must report unanticipated results or conditions that the prior year's
MD&A failed to anticipate. In both situations, the Commission has the benefit
of hindsight when it reviews ex post facto a registrant's MD&A for a possible
violation of the securities laws.
V. MD&A DISCLOSURE UNDER ITEM 303
The express goal of the MD&A discussion is to provide investors and
other users with relevant information concerning the amounts and certainty of
cash flows from operations and outside sources so that investors may properly
evaluate the financial condition and results of operations of a registrant.50
49. See generally Greg W. Corso & Richard A. Sifen, Disclosure of Financial Information
in Contested Proxy Solicitations, 4 INSIGHTS 9 (Sept. 1990) (discussing the use of prospective
information in contested proxy contests); Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft
Information under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723 (1989) (discussing
materiality standards that vary with the nature of the soft information disclosed); James R.
Repetti, Management Buyouts, Efficient Markets, Fair Value, and Soft Information, 67 N.C. L.
REv. 121 (1988) (calling for mandatory disclosure of soft information pertaining to buyouts and
bailouts); RogerJ. Dennis, ManagementDisclosure Theory and Management Projections:A Law
and Economics Perspective, 46 MD. L. REV. 1197 (1987) (discussing disclosure in specific
transactions and materiality levels); Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Disclosure of Preliminary Merger
Negotiations as an Imperfect Paradigm of Rule lOb-S Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1218 (1987)
(discussing the duty to disclose preliminary merger discussions); Thomas L. Hazen, Rumor
Control and Disclosure of Merger Negotiations or Other Control-Related Transactions: Full
Disclosure or "No Comment" - The Only Safe-Harbors, 46 MD. L. REV. 954 (1987) (regarding
disclosure obligations during on-going merger negotiations); Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the
Courts' Approach to Disclosure of Earnings Projections, Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft
Information: Old Problems, Changing Views, 46 MD. L. REV. 1114 (1987) (surveying various
materiality standards); Janet E. Kerr, A Walk Through the Circuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft
Information, 46 MD. L. REv. 1071 (1987) (surveying various interpretations of the duty to
disclose soft information); Marc I. Steinberg & Robin M. Goldman, IssuerAffirmative Disclosure
Obligations - An Analytical Framework for Merger Negotiations, Soft Information, and Bad
News, 46 MD. L. REV. 923 (1987) (discussing interpretations of the duty to disclose soft
information); Carl. W. Schneider, Panel Discussion Comments in NewApproaches to Disclosure
in Registered Securities Offerings, 28 Bus. LAW. 505, 506-18 (1973) (discussing materiality
standards and soft information disclosure); Carl W. Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information
in Sec Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1972) (discussing materiality standards based on the
relevance of soft information).
50. 17 C.F.R § 229.303(a)Instruction2 (1993); see also John W. Bagby, et al., Management
Discussion of Business Performance: Analytical and Empirical Evaluation, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 57
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Considering that objective, MD&A mandates that a registrant's discussion and
analysis include financial statements and other statistical data that the registrant
believes will enhance the user's understanding of the enterprise's financial
condition and results of operations.5 ' In general, Item 303(a) directs that the
discussion include a year-to-year comparison52 of the financial statements
over a three year period.53 Information provided pursuant to Item 303(a)
"need only include that which is available to the registrant without undue
effort or expense and which does not clearly appear in the registrant's financial
statements. "s4
As will be discussed in detail, Item 303(a) charges registrants with the
task of addressing three essential matters in their MD&A: (1) liquidity,55 (2)
capital resources,56 and (3) results of operations.57 Registrants must also
determine whether reporting supplemental segment or subdivision informa-
tion58 or engaging in line item disclosure 9 to facilitate a better understand-
ing of the registrant's business as a whole is necessary. Further, Item 303(b)
instructs registrants to update their MD&As through interim period reporting.
A. Liquidity
MD&A requires all registrants to present a discussion and analysis of
liquidity. Liquidity in Item 303(a) is defined as "the ability of an enterprise
to generate adequate amounts of cash to meet the enterprise's needs for
cash."' Liquidity encompasses not only the registrant's ability to meet its
obligations as they become due, but also the registrant's ability to preserve
existing capacity and provide for planned expansion.61 Liquidity for purposes
of MD&A is significantly broader than the Financial Accounting Standards
Board's (FASB) concept of liquidity, because MD&A liquidity encompasses
(1988) (discussing recent changes in SEC disclosure requirements and presenting a theoretical
framework for classification of information).
51. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) Instruction 1 (1993).
52. The registrant may use any format which, in the registrant's best judgement, will enhance
the user's understanding. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) Instruction 1. However, the onus will be
upon the registrant to substantiate the reasonableness of an alternative format used as appropriate
if later challenged as fraudulent or materially misleading.
53. See id. The instruction also directs that when trend information is relevant, reference to
five-year selected financial data may be necessary. Id.
54. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 Instruction 2 (1993).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1)(1993).
56. Id. § 229.303(a)(2).
57. Id. § 229.303(a)(3).
58. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1993).
59. See id. Instruction 4.
60. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 Instruction 5 (1993).
61. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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all potential sources of cash62 and is not limited to balance sheet accounts. 3
Nevertheless, when appropriate, registrants are expected to feature traditional
balance sheet indicators' in their MD&As unless they otherwise make clear
the company's liquidity in the explanatory discussion.'
In circumstances when financial statements incorporated by reference or
presented in a registration statement are required to include a disclosure of
restrictions on the ability of consolidated and unconsolidated subsidiaries to
transfer funds to the registrant in the form of cash dividends, loans, or
advances, the MD&A must discuss the extent, nature, and impact of such
restrictions on the parent companies' ability to meet their cash obligations.'
The liquidity discussion must present both a long-term and short-term
analysis in the context of the registrant's business or businesses.67 Regis-
trants must also identify "any known trends . . . demands, commitments,
events, or uncertainties that will result in or that are reasonably likely to result
in the registrant's liquidity increasing or decreasing in any material way."68
If a registrant identifies material deficiencies, the registrant must indicate the
course of action that has or will be taken to alleviate the deficiency.69
Furthermore, registrants are obligated not only to identify, but also to describe
separately all internal and external sources of liquidity and briefly discuss any
surplus sources of material liquid assets.7"
Registrants are often faced with a Hobson's choice: If the registrant's
62. MD&A liquidity encompasses all internal and external source of cash. In order to foster
meaningful dialogue, the drafters of Item 303 opted to avoid a precise or narrow definition to the
term "liquidity." Instead, Item 303 gives registrants wide latitude to fix the appropriate indices
of liquidity.
63. See Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,430 n.31. The Commission's
concept of liquidity is analogous to the FASB's concept of financial flexibility regarding the
enterprise's ability to adjust its future cash flow to meet anticipated and unanticipated
requirements and opportunities. Id.
64. Balance sheet liquidity indicators might include cash reserves, marketable securities,
accounts receivables, and inventory levels.
65. Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,431. This release states:
Registrants are expected to u , the statement of cash flows, and other appropriate
indicators,'in analyzing their lie. "dity, and to present a balanced discussion dealing
with cash flows from investing a.id financing activities as well as from operations.
This discussion should address those matters that have materially affected the most
recent period presented but are not expected to have short or long-term implications,
and those matters that have not materially affected the most recent period presented
but are expected materially to affect future periods.
Id.
66. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) Instruction 6 (1993).
67. Id. Instruction 5.
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liquidity situation is problematic, failure to disclose adequately such informa-
tion is a clear and flagrant violation of Item 303 .7  However, full public
disclosure can potentially exacerbate the situation. For example, perceiving
a risk of default, commercial and institutional lenders as well as trade creditors
may simply terminate lines of credit, hesitate to extend new credit, seek to
tighten existing credit terms and conditions, or demand higher interest rates.
Nevertheless, the potential adverse impact of full disclosure can be mitigated
if a registrant puts forth a feasible strategy that is expected to rectify the
problem in its MD&A.
In summary, good faith compliance with Item 303(a) regarding a
registrant's liquidity discussion and analysis calls for an extensive and ongoing
study of the enterprise's internal cash flow. Multiple cash flow projections
based on public companies' best judgment of the optimal, most likely, and
worst case liquidity scenarios would benefit the companies. Because MD&A
directs registrants to consider their long and short-term liquidity positions,
registrants would be prudent to prepare cash flow projections on both positions
as well.
B. Capital Resources
MD&A mandates that registrants discuss their "material commitments for
capital expenditures as of the end of the latest fiscal period, and indicate the
general purpose of such commitments and the anticipated source of funds
needed to fulfill such commitments." 72 Registrants must communicate any
known material capital resource trends, whether they are favorable or
unfavorable.13 Further, registrants must address material changes in the mix
and relative cost of such resources, as well as appraise changes among equity,
debt, and any off-balance sheet financing arrangements.74 Under Item
303(a), a registrant's capital resource commitment disclosure should not be
limited to present, legally binding commitments; rather, it should encompass
all reasonably anticipated capital resource expenditures.75 Thus, a regis-
71. See In re Francis, [1982-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,503 (June
20, 1986) (finding Exchange Act violation for offering to sell refinery interest at a price well
below the value shown on the financial statement without taking a write-down); In re
VanLaningham, [1982-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,502 (June 20, 1986)
(finding materially false and misleading MD&A due to failure to disclose liquidity concerns such
as losses of trade credit, demands by the registrant's banks for restrictive loan covenants, and
discussions between the registrant and its banks regarding asset sales, dividends, and operational
changes).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(2)(i) (1993). The discussion of capital resources and liquidity
may be merged where appropriate under Item 303(a).
73. Id. § 229.303(a)(2)(ii).
74. Id.
75. See Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,429 (discussing the expansive
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trant's compliance with the capital resources discussion in MD&A necessitates
an appraisal of the organization's overall capacity to raise additional capital -
be it debt or equity - and the associated cost of so doing. In particular,
registrants should consider the limits of their existing lines of credit and any
untapped potential sources of commercial borrowing. Prudence also dictates
that registrants regularly examine the potential impact of any restrictive debt
covenants and their ability to recapitalize or financially restructure, if
necessary.
C. Results of Operations
The registrant's MD&A must include an extensive delineation of the
results of its operations. Registrants must describe any significant or unusual
economic events or transactions that have materially affected the amount of
reported income from continuing operations, indicating the extent to which
income was so affected. 76 Further, they must also describe other significant
components of revenues or expenses necessary to understand the results of
operations."
Registrants must communicate any known material trends or uncertainties,
favorable or unfavorable, reasonably expected to impact net sales, revenues,
or income from continuing operations. 78  Additionally, Item 303(a) states a
duty to disclose any known trends, demands, commitments, events, or
uncertainties that will materially alter the relationship between revenues and
expenses.
79
nature of a registrant's disclosure obligation regarding capital resource expenditures). The release
states:
In preparing the MD&A disclosure, registrants should focus on each of the
specific categories of known data. For example, Item 303(a)(2)(i) requires a
description of the registrant's material "commitments" for capital expenditures as of
the end of the latest fiscal period. However, even where no legal commitments,
contractual or otherwise, have been made, disclosure is required if material planned
capital expenditures result from a known demand, as where the expenditures are
necessary to a continuation of the registrant's current growth trend. Similarly, if the
same registrant determines not to incur such expenditures, a known uncertainty would
exist regarding continuation of the current growth trend. If the adverse effect on the
registrant from discontinuation of the growth trend is reasonably likely to be material,
disclosure is required. Disclosure of planned material expenditures is also required,
for example, when such expenditures are necessary to support a new, publicly
announced product or line of business.
Id.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(i) (1993).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii).
79. Id. Examples would be "known future increases in costs of labor or materials or price
increases or inventory adjustments. . . ." Id.
[Vol. 45:477
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If the registrants' financial statements disclose material increases in net
sales or revenues, a narrative discussion must accompany the MD&A to
explain the extent that such increases are attributable to increases in prices,
volume, the amount of goods or services being sold, or the introduction of
new products or services."0 The Commission's position is that a narrative
explanation of the financial statements is necessary "'because a numerical
presentation and brief accompanying footnotes alone may be insufficient for
an investor to judge the quality of earnings and the likelihood that past
performance is indicative of future performance.'"" The Commission stated
that "lilt is the responsibility of management to identify and address those key
variables and other qualitative and quantitative factors which are peculiar to
and necessary for an understanding and evaluation of the individual compa-
ny. "
82
Item 303 instructs registrants to assess the impact of material inflation and
changes in prices on its, net sales, revenues, and income from operations."
The item requires such disclosure for the three most recent fiscal years.'
The Commission gives registrants considerable latitude in determining which
inflationary effect and other changes in prices are material." The registrants
need not present any specific numerical financial data.86 Rather, the rules
require only a "brief textual presentation" of management's views of this
subject." The Commission encourages the registrant to experiment with the
various methods of disclosure (which is required when the impact of inflation
is material) to determine the most meaningful presentation, by allowing
registrants to elect voluntary disclosure of supplemental information88 on the
impact of changing prices on the registrant's financial statements as provided
for in Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 89, Financial
80. Id. § 229.303(a)(3)(iii) (1993).
81. Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,428 (quoting Securities Act Release
6711, supra note 2, at 88,623).
82. Securities Act Release No. 6349, supra note 22, at 964.
83. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(iv) (1993).
84. Id. Disclosure is required for the shorter period of either the three most recent fiscal
years after Dec. 25, 1979 or the number of fiscal years in which the registrant has been engaged
in business. Id.
85. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) Instruction 8 (1993).
86. Id. However, foreign private registrants and registrants subject to hyper-inflation must
comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 3-20(c) of Regulation S-X. See 17 C.F.R. §
210.3-20(c) (1993).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) Instruction 8 (1993).
88. Id. Instructions 8-9. Further, Instruction 9 to Item 303(a) permits a registrant that elects
to disclose supplemental information on the effects of changing prices pursuant to Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 89 to combine such explanation and analysis with other
required disclosure under the Item or separately state such information with appropriate cross
references. Id. Instruction 9.
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Reporting and Changing Prices.89
D. Segment/Subdivision Reporting
Item 303(a) dictates that registrants focus on each relevant, reportable
business segment or subdivision and on the enterprise as a whole when, in the
registrant's best judgment, a discussion of business segments or subdivisions
would be germane to the understanding of its business.' The Commission
has declared that "[i]n formulating a judgment as to whether a discussion of
segment information is necessary to an understanding of the business, a multi-
segment registrant . . . should analyze revenues, profitability and the cash
needs of its . . . segments." 9' Further, the Commission noted that a
registrant should include segment disclosure in his MD&A to the extent
discussion on a consolidated basis would be misleading or present an
incomplete picture of the business, or when any segment or subdivision's
contribution is materially disproportionate.'
E. Line Item Disclosure
Similar to the registrant's obligation to disclose segment or subdivision
information is the line item disclosure requirement. 93 The instructions to
Item 303(a) stipulate that a registrant must describe material consolidated
financial statement line item changes each year to the extent necessary for
investors or other users to appreciate the registrant's business as a whole, with
one caveat: If the reason for a change in a certain line item relates to other
line item fluctuations, then repetition and line-by-line analysis of the financial
statements as a whole is not required or appropriate. 94 The Commission has
89. Id. SFAS No. 89 supersedes SFAS No. 33, becoming effective for fiscal years ending
after Dec. 2, 1986. Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement 14, 1 Original Pronounce-
ments § C28.101 (1991).
90. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (1993).
91. Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,432.
92. Id. Segment or subdivision MD&A disclosure may be necessary when there are legal or
other restrictions placed upon the free flow of funds between segments or subdivisions; when
known material trends, demands, commitments, events or uncertainties within a segment or
subdivision are reasonably likely to occur and may effect the enterprise as a whole; when the
financial flexibility of a registrant is constrainedby its ability to divest certain assets of a segment
or subdivision; and when disclosure of segment or subdivision data is otherwise prudent to assist
user's of the registrant's MD&A to fully appreciate its business. Id.
93. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) Instruction 4.
94. Id. Registrants are not required to recite the amount for variation of a line item if it can
be easily calculated from the consolidated financial statement data and are discouraged from
pointlessly repeating numerical information contained in the financial statements. Id. However,
according to the Commission, "quantification should otherwise be as precise, including use of
[Vol. 45:477
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announced that an analysis of changes in line items is required when there
exists a material and divergent change from related line items in the regis-
trant's financial statements.' Thus, registrants are to identify, and, if
possible, quantify the extent of the contribution of each of two or more
contributing factors.96
F. Interim Period Reporting
Registrants under Item 303(b) are instructed to include a "discussion and
analysis of the financial condition and results of operations to... enable the
reader to assess material changes in financial conditions. " 91 The interim
period discussion and analysis9" must include those items listed in Item
303(a), except the registrant does not need to address the impact of inflation
and changing prices on the results of operations. 99
The interim period MD&A compels a registrant to "[d]iscuss material
changes in [its] financial condition from the end of the preceding fiscal year
to the date of the most recent interim balance sheet provided."" ° Also, if
the registrant provides in its financial statements a balance sheet dated as of
the corresponding interim date of the preceding fiscal year, then the registrant
must discuss any material changes in its financial condition from that date to
the date of the most recent balance sheet provided in the MD&A. 101
Registrants must also include a discussion of the results of operations in
dollar amounts or percentages, as reasonably practicable." Securities Act Release No. 6835,
supra note 1, at 22,431.
95. See Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,431. The Commission has also
stated:
Discussion of the impact of discontinued operations and of extraordinary gains
and losses is also required where these items have had or are reasonably likely to
have a material effect on reported or future financial condition or results of
operations. Other non-recurring items should be discussed as "unusual or infrequent"
events or transaction "that materially affected the amount of reported income from
continuing operations."
Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(i));see also SEC v. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 39 SEC Docket
(CCH) 196 (Sept. 9, 1967) (finding a failure to disclose a real estate sale as an unusual and
infrequent event).
96. See Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,431.
97. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(b) (1993).
98. The interim period reporting requirements delineated in Article 3 of Regulation S-X
include Forms 10-K and 10-Q. See 17 C.F.R §§ 210.3-01 to .3-20 (1993).
99. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(b); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.3-01 to .3-20 (1993) (providing
general instructions concerning the preparation of financial statements, including interim
statements).
100. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(b)(1) (1993).
101. Id. The registrant may combine the discussion of changes from the end of the fiscal year
and the corresponding interim date of the preceding fiscal year. Id.
1994]
17
Croft: MD&A: The Tightrope of Disclosure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1994
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
their interim period MD&As.Ita The discussion is designed to address
material changes from "the most recent fiscal year-to-date period for which an
income statement is provided and the corresponding year-to-date period of the
preceding fiscal year."103 For example, if a registrant elects or is required
to provide an income statement for the most recent fiscal quarter, the
discussion must also cover material changes between that fiscal quarter and the
corresponding prior year fiscal quarter.'14 When a registrant
has elected to provide an income statement for the twelve-month period
ending as of the date of the most recent interim balance sheet provided, the
discussion also shall cover material changes with respect to that twelve-
month period and the twelve-month period ended as of the corresponding
interim balance sheet date of the preceding fiscal year.10
5
In certain situations the Commission steadfastly maintains that registrants
have a duty to update MD&A disclosure periodically. "6 Accordingly, the
existence of "known trends, demands, commitments, events, or uncertainties"
that arise during the interim reporting period may constitute required interim
MD&A disclosure if they are reasonably likely to have a material effect on the
registrant's financial condition or results of operation."°
VI. THE FUNCTION OF SROs AND THE ACCOUNTING
PROFESSION IN MD&A
While the Commission has studied the issue of adequate MD&A
disclosure and has attempted to implement a framework for compliance, the
accounting profession and Self-Regulating Organizations"°8 have remained
102. Id. § 229.303(b)(2).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(b)(2) (1993). Item 303(b)(2) stipulates the following regarding a
registration income statement:
[If]... a registrant... provides a statement of income for the twelve-month period
ended as of the date of the most recent interim balance sheet provided in lieu of the
interim income statements otherwise required, the discussion of material changes in
that twelve-month period will be in respect to the preceding fiscal year rather than the
corresponding preceding period.
Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-03(b) (1993) (providing the option of including a statement of
income for either period).
106. See Securities Release Act No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,432.
107. Id. Changes sufficient to warrant interim period reporting would include expected
material changes in "internal and external sources of liquidity, expected material changes in the
mix and relative cost of such resources, and unusual or infrequent events or transactions that
materially affected the amount of reported income from continuing operations." Id.
108. The Self-Regulating Organizations (SROs) include the New York Stock Exchange
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in the shadows. A strong argument can be made that the disclosure of public
companies could be improved if the public accountants and SROs assumed a
more active role.
A. The Function of the Accounting Profession
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are a set of conven-
tions used to assemble financial accounting data and present such information
in the form of financial statements. GAAP deals primarily with quantifiable,
historic financial data. All entities are subject to transactions or events that
have a profound impact on them, but are not readily quantifiable. For years
the accounting profession has struggled to find the appropriate means to
capture and report such information.
In 1986 the managing partners of seven accounting firms released a white
paper that "called for increased risk disclosure, but contemplated that such
disclosure would be separate from MD&A and would be subjected to audit
coverage."19 Thereafter, the accounting profession issued an Exposure
Draft that would have established performance and reporting criteria for
auditors who attested to a public company's MD&A representations. 10
Although public accounting firms are uniquely positioned to assess the
accuracy and completeness of a registrant's MD&A disclosure during the
course of an audit, their role in MD&A remains somewhat disingenuous
because MD&A is generally deemed beyond the scope of the financial
statements. Consequently, MD&A is neither subject to GAAP nor to an
audit."' However, much of the. information disclosed in MD&A relates to
(NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD).
109. Securities Act Release No. 6835, supra note 1, at 22,427.
110. The Auditing Standards Board issued an exposure draft of a proposed statement on
standards for attestation engagements entitled Examination of Management's Discussion and
Analysis on Feb. 14, 1987.
111. The auditor's involvementwith MD&A is limited to a few auditing standards. See AICPA
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 8, Other Information in
Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements, AU § 550 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1992); AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Statement on Auditing Standards No.
53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Irregularities, AU § 316 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1992); AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 54, Illegal Acts by Clients, AU § 317 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1992) (requiring certain matters to be communicated to the audit cominittee); see
also AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 19, Client
Representations, AU § 333 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1992) (requiring the
independent auditor to obtain written representations from management); AICPA PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 61, Communication With Audit Committee,
AU § 380 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1992) (requiring certain matters to be
communicated to the audit committee); AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, Statement on
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matters routinely falling within the scope of an audit. While auditors are
generally not obligated to corroborate information outside the report's financial
statements, they are required to read the other information included in the
document containing the audit report, such as MD&A, to determine whether
such information or its manner of presentation is consistent with the financial
statements on which the accountant expresses the audit opinion. "2 Further,
the auditor is to take appropriate measures if inconsistencies or misstatements
are present."1 3
Many contend that public accountants should assume a more prominent
role in evaluating the MD&A of public companies. In fact, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) recently issued an exposure
draft of a proposed statement of position regarding financial statement
disclosure.' The Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the
AICPA concluded in this proposal that "[r]eporting entities should make
disclosure in the notes to the financial statements beyond those now required
or generally made in financial statements about the risks and uncertainties
existing as of the date of those statements ... ."11 The Committee
identified the following non-mutually exclusive disclosure areas: (1) nature of
operations,11 6 (2) use of estimates in the preparation of financial state-
ments, " 7 (3) certain significant estimates, " (4) current vulnerability due
Auditing Standards No. 7, Communications Between Predecessor and Successor Auditors, AU
§ 315 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1992) (providing guidance on communication
when a change of auditors occurs).
112. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 8, supra note 111.
113. Id.
114. Exposure Draft, Proposed Statement of Position, Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks
and Uncertainties and Financial Flexibility, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(Mar. 31, 1993).
115. Id. at 11.
116. Id. at 11. Regarding the nature of operations, the Committee opined:
Notes to financial statements should include a description of the major products
or services the reporting entity sells or provides and its principal markets, including
the locations of those markets. If the entity operates in more than one industry, the
disclosure should also indicate the relative importance of its operations in each
industry and the basis for the determination. . . . Disclosures about the nature of
operations need not be quantified; relative importance could be conveyed by use of
terms such as predominately, about equally, or major and other.
Id. at 12 (footnotes omitted).
117. Id. at 11. "Notes to all financial statements prepared in conformity with GAAP should
include an explanation that the preparation of financial statements in conformity with GAAP
requires the use of management's estimates." Id. at 12.
118. Id. at 11. The AICPA Proposal stated that:
Notes to financial statements should discuss the potential near-term effects on the
financial statements of the risks and uncertainties associated with estimates used in the
determination of the carrying amounts of assets or liabilities or disclosure of gain or
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to concentrations, 119 and (5) financial flexibility. 120
Several members of the Committee criticized the proposal. First, they
believed that the proposal increased the responsibility of independent
accountants and significantly altered the accountants' relationship to the
information disclosed by requiring that the information become an integral part
of the financial statements."' Further, they objected to the subjective nature
of the information, which one could easily challenge and thereby expose the
accountant to excessive legal risks."z Lastly, those critical of the proposal
claimed that compliance with the proposal placed a disproportionate economic
burden on private entities and their accountants. " Interestingly, these are
some of the same arguments cited by critics of MD&A.
The proposal varies from the requirements of Item 303 in at least three
respects. First, MD&A requires a discussion of liquidity and capital resources
in all situations, whereas the proposal "requires a discussion of financial
flexibility only when it is reasonably possible that the reporting entity's
financial flexibility will be called on in the near term."124 Second, while
MD&A requires a discussion of a registrant's liquidity and capital resources
on both a long and short-term basis, the proposal applies only to the near
term."z Finally, Item 303 requires registrants to use a cash flow statement
to analyze their liquidity and capital resources in terms of investing, financing,
and operating activities; the proposal's disclosure does not mandate a statement
of cash flows or categorization of the items discussed.' 26
loss contingencies when both of the following criteria are met:
* It is at least reasonably possible that the estimate will change in the near term.
* The effect of the change would be material to the financial statements.
These evaluations should be based on information available prior to issuance of
the financial statements and of which management is reasonably expected to have
knowledge.
Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
119. Id. at 11. Current vulnerability due to concentrationmeans "[a]ny concentration existing
at the date of the financial statements that makes the enterprise vulnerable to the risk of a near-
term severe impact [that] should be disclosed when it is at least reasonably possible that the
events that could cause the near-term severe impact will occur." Id. at 15.
120. Id. at 11. The proposal requires "a discussionof management's expected course of action
when it is determined that it is at least reasonably possible that the entity will not have the ability
over the near term to pay its expected cash outflows without taking certain actions." Id. at 16.
This determination should be made by management "based on information available prior to the
issuance of the financial statements and which management is reasonably expected to have
knowledge." Id.
121. Id. at 18-19.
122. Id. at 19.
123. Id.
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The proposal's aim is to improve "disclosure about the risks and
uncertainties that face reporting entities .... 27 Unfortunately, due to the
proposal's substantial deviations from the requirements of MD&A, it fails to
achieve its objective and is of little value to registrants attempting to comply
with the MD&A disclosure requirements.
B. The Function of the Self-Regulating Organizations
The listing agreements of both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) require listed companies to
promptly disclose material information, but they also include liberal business
judgement exceptions. 2 Notwithstanding their less than aggressive stance
on disclosure, both exchanges have issued strict rules explicitly enjoining the
selective disclosure of information. 29
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) also insists that
its members make timely disclosures of material information. 130  However,
127. Id. at 9.
128. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Listed Company Manual states that listed
companies are "expected to release quickly to the public any news or information which might
reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its securities." NYSE Listed Company
Manual § 202.05 (1989). The Manual describes the business judgement exception as follows:
Judgment must be exercised as to the timing of a public release on those
corporate developments where ... disclosure would endanger the company's goals
or provide information helpful to a competitor. In these cases, the company should
weigh the fairness to both present and potential shareholders who at any given
moment may be considering buying or selling the company's stock.
Id. § 202.06(A).
The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) Guide maintains that "[a] listed company is
required to make immediate public disclosure of all material information concerning its affairs,
except in unusual circumstances." AMEX Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) 10,121 § 401(a)
(1993). The AMEX Guide permits a listed company to exercise its business judgement by
withholding material information "[w]hen immediate disclosure would prejudice the ability of te
company to pursue its corporate objectives .... [and] [w]hen the facts are in a state of flux and
a more appropriate moment for disclosure is imminent." Id. 10,122, § 402(a).
129. The NYSE Manual instructs public companies "not to give information to one inquirer
which it would not give to another, nor should it reveal information it would not willingly give
or has not given to the press for publication." NYSE Listed Company Manual § 202.02(A).
Therefore, for listed companies "to give advance earnings, dividend, stock split, merger, or
tender information to analysts ... would clearly violate Exchange policy." Id.
The AMEX Guide similarly instructs listed organization to "make available to the public
information necessary for informed investing and to take reasonable steps to ensure that all who
invest in its securities enjoy equal access to such information."AMEX Company Guide 10,121,
§ 401.
130. The NASD Manual states that member companiesmust disclose "any material information
which may affect the value of their securities or influence investors' decisions .... " NASD
Manual (CCH) 1806A, at 1572 (1993).
[Vol. 45:477
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unlike the other SROs, NASD neither expressly provides a business judgement
exception nor addresses the problem of selective disclosure. Nevertheless, as
a practical matter, NASD would be obliged to afford companies some latitude
to temporarily withhold disclosure.
VII. RECENT AUTHORrrms
A. In re Caterpillar, Inc.
In the first enforcement action solely involving MD&A disclosure, In re
Caterpillar Inc.,"' the Commission alleged that a public company failed to
adequately disclose information concerning its subsidiary's results of
operations and the impact of those results on the consolidated financial
statements presented in the company's required periodic SEC filings.
Caterpillar is a respected international corporation engaged in the
manufacture of earth-moving and other heavy-duty construction equipment.
In 1989, Caterpillar's wholly-owned subsidiary, Caterpillar Brazil, S.A.
(CBSA), was exceptionally profitable. On a consolidated basis, CBSA
accounted for approximately twenty-three percent of Caterpillar's net profits,
yet it represented only five percent of the parent company's total reve-
nues. 1
32
While CBSA's operating results were comparable to those of previous
years, several external factors contributed to its immense profits. The
following four nonoperating factors contributed significantly to CBSA's
performance: (1) currency translation gains, (2) export subsidies, (3) interest
income, and (4) Brazilian tax loss carry-forwards. Brazil's hyperinflation
generated most of these gains.133 In a country suffering from hyperinflation,
a rational consumer will purchase hard goods rather than hold currency.
Caterpillar consolidated CBSA's financial results with those of its other
operations and presented those results together; consequently, the impact of
CBSA's performance on Caterpillar's overall results was not readily apparent
from Caterpillar's financial statements.
34
Historically, Caterpillar reported its financial results on a consolidated
basis in accordance with its perception of the company as an integrated
organization. 13  Under GAAP, Caterpillar was not compelled to present
CBSA as either a separate industry segment or a foreign operation. 36 The
131. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, supra note 9.
132. Id. at 63,051.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 63,051 & n.1.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 63,055.
19941
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Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 14137 (FASB Statement
14) defines an industry segment by looking to functional product differenc-
es.138  CBSA's products were not functionally different from those of its
parent company; therefore, CBSA was not a separate industry segment.1
39
Furthermore, although CBSA was a foreign operation, Caterpillar was not
obligated under FASB Statement 14 to report separately CBSA's results
because CBSA accounted for less than ten percent of Caterpillar's consolidated
revenues, and CBSA's assets were less than ten percent of the consolidated
total assets.
140
Given CBSA's significant contribution to Caterpillar's overall results of
operations, in January 1990, Caterpillar began separately analyzing CBSA's
1989 accounting data compared with 1990 financial forecasts.141 During the
February 1990 meeting of Caterpillar's Board of Directors, management
informed the Board that there was substantial uncertainty whether CBSA's
1989 performance would be repeated in 1990. Management also informed the
Board that CBSA's results would have a significant negative impact on
Caterpillar as a whole. 142 Specifically, management cautioned the Board that
Brazil was "volatile." 43 The Board of Directors was told that "the impact
of Brazil [was] so significant to reduced 1990 projected results, [that manage-
ment] felt it was necessary to explain it [to the directors] in some detail." 1"
This management report ultimately induced the Commission to sanction
Caterpillar.
At its April 1990 meeting, management informed the Caterpillar Board
that the outcome of ongoing economic reforms in Brazil was uncertain, and
there existed a considerable risk that the reforms could exert additional
pressure on CBSA's 1990 performance. After monitoring the operating
137. FASB Statement No. 14, Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise, 2
Original Pronouncements 3393 (1993) [hereinafter FASB Statement 14]; see also Exchange Act
Release No. 30,532, supra note 9, at 63,055 n.9 (discussing the application of FASB Statement
14 on Caterpillar).
138. FASB Statement No. 14, supra note 137, at 3430.
139. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, supra note 9, at 63,055 n.9.
140. FASB Statement 14, supra note 137, at 3409-10; Exchange Act Release No. 30,532,
supra note 9, at 63,055 n.9.
141. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, supra note 9, at 63,051.
142. Id. The minutes of the February 1990 Board meeting contained the following statement:
"[Management] commented on results of operations in Brazil because of the significant [negative]
impact they will have on overall results for 1990." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 63,051-52. Fernando Collor de Mello was elected president of Brazil in
December of 1989 and inaugurated on March 15, 1990. After taking office, President Collor
immediately instituted sweeping economic and monetary reforms in an attempt to control the
hyperinflation that was plaguing the Brazilian economy. However, Brazil was thrust into further
[Vol. 45:477
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results of CBSA, it became clear to Caterpillar that the new Brazilian
economic policies would cause CBSA to suffer significant losses in 1990.
Furthermore, Caterpillar realized that CBSA's losses would not be absorbed
by gains in other international markets and, consequently, Caterpillar's
consolidated results of operations would be lower than originally anticipat-
ed.'46 Caterpillar voluntarily issued a press release on June 25, 1990,
announcing that it anticipated substantially lower 1990 results than had been
previously projected. 47
Despite the emerging developments in Brazil, the MD&A sections of
Caterpillar's 1989 Annual Report (Form 10-K) (filed in March 1990) and its
first Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) failed to separately disclose CBSA's effect
on Caterpillar's consolidated results for 1989. Further, the reports did not
indicate the disproportionate impact which Caterpillar anticipated the
deterioration in CBSA's performance would have upon its 1990 consolidated
results. Instead, both reports appeared to down play both the importance of
the faltering Brazilian economy and the extent that CBSA's anticipated adverse
results would affect Caterpillar as a whole.' Consequently, the relationship
between Caterpillar's overall results of operations and that of CBSA was not
apparent to investors and other users of the periodic reports.
Regarding Caterpillar's Annual Report (Form 10-K) MD&A of the results
economic turmoil when President Collor de Mello removed approximately 80% of outstanding
currency from circulation and adopted a plan to devalue the cruzado. Id.
146. See id. at 63,052.
147. Id. The June 25, 1990 press release stated that "more than half of the decrease in
forecasted 1990 profit is due to a dramatic decline in results for [CBSA]." Id.
148. See id. at 63,053. The Commission's Opinion included the following excerpts from
Caterpillar's 1989 Annual Report (Form 10-K):
Dealer machine sales rose in most selling areas, with demand especially strong
in... Brazil ....
Sales rose 14% in 1989, the sixth consecutiveyear of improvement. The biggest
gain was in Brazil, where very high inflation rates increased demand for hard goods,
including earth moving equipment. (Given the extraordinary high rate of inflation in
Brazil, many contractors preferred to own hard assets, such as equipment, rather than
depreciating cruzados.) Toward year-end, however, sales growth in Brazil moderated
as interest rates rose.
Latin American countries continue to be plagued with debt problems. However,
debt rescheduling; stable profitable commodity prices; and increased privatization
should help business in some countries. Sales in Brazil, however, could be hurt by
post-election policies which will likely aim at curbing inflation.
Id. at 63,053 n.4. The Commission also included in its Opinion the following statements of
George Schaefer, Caterpillar's Chairman of the Board of Directors, from its 1990 Quarterly
Report (Form 10-O: "First-quarter sales were somewhat stronger than anticipated. Nevertheless,
the company continues to be concerned about tight monetary policies in major industrial
countries;... and the uncertainty of the economic situation in Brazil." Id.
1994]
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of operations for 1989, the Commission held: "Given the magnitude of
CBSA's contribution to Caterpillar's overall earnings, disclosure of the extent
of that contribution was required under the MD&A provisions of Regulation
S-K since CBSA's earnings materially affected Caterpillar's reported income
from continuing operations." '49 The Commission opined: "Furthermore,
the MD&A should have discussed various factors which contributed to
CBSA's earnings... since such items were significant components of CBSA's
revenues that should have been identified and addressed in order for a reader
of the company's financial statements to understand Caterpillar's results of
operations." 5 0
With respect to Caterpillar's inadequate discussion of the uncertainties
affecting CBSA's prospects for 1990 and the possible material impact on
Caterpillar's overall results, the Commission began its analysis by reiterating
the Securities Act Release No. 6835 test for determining when disclosure is
required."I In concluding that Caterpillar had not satisfied that test and
therefore, disclosure was required, the Commission noted:
By the time of the February 14, 1990, board meeting - two weeks before
Caterpillar's Form 10-K for 1989 was filed - management could not
conclude that lower earnings from CBSA were not reasonably likely to
occur, nor could management conclude that a material effect on Cater-
pillar's results of operations was not reasonably likely to occur due to
CBSA's lower earnings. 52
This was true because management communicated to directors at that meeting
the negative impact of CBSA on 1990 projected results. Further, the
Commission noted that disclosure was required because "[b]y the end of the
first quarter of 1990, before Caterpillar's Form 10-Q for the first quarter of
1990 was filed, management had concluded that 'the profit in Brazil will be
substantially lower than in 1989.'"53 Finally, the Commission determined
that "it became even more apparent that management could not conclude that
lower earnings from CBSA were not reasonably likely to occur, nor could
management conclude that a material effect on Caterpillar's results of
operations was not reasonably likely to occur due to CBSA's lower earn-
ings. "154
The Commission's Order resolved that Caterpillar's MD&A was deficient
149. Id. at 63,055. The Commission referenced the requirements of Item 303(a)(3)(i) as the
basis for such disclosure. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 63,055.
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in two respects. First, Caterpillar's 1989 Annual Report (Form 10-K) failed
to provide adequate discussion and analysis of CBSA's impact on Caterpillar's
consolidated results of operations for the period.' Second, the Commission
ruled that Caterpillar violated § 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 13a-1
and 13a-13 by failing to adequately disclose in its 1989 Annual Report (Form
10-K) and 1990 Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) known uncertainties reasonably
likely to materially affect future results of operations of Caterpillar, as a
whole, due to CBSA's doubtful ability to repeat its 1989 performance." 6
B. Implications of Caterpillar
Careful review of Caterpillar reveals that the Commission stressed certain
key factors it believes should alert the registrant of the need for more
extensive MD&A disclosure. These factors include the following: (1) unusual
or atypical financial results; (2) significant financial or operational develop-
ments; (3) items that could have a significant impact on the registrant's
financial or operational prospects; (4) matters of which the registrant's
management is cognizant, but which shareholders might not readily ascertain
from the face of the registrant's financial statement or the notes thereto; (5)
changes in the way management gathers, reports, views or considers
significant operating results; (6) changes in the mix of the registrant's revenues
or profit (losses); (7) changes in the registrant's relationship with customers,
suppliers, and competitors; (8) changes in significant extrinsic factors (such as
governmental regulations) that have or could have a significant impact on the
registrant's business operations or financial condition; (9) matters that are the
subject of the retention of special advisors or experts; and (10) matters deemed
significant enough to be brought to the attention of the registrant's board of
directors, or a committee thereof. 5 7
The Commission's Caterpillar Release purports to be fact specific;
however, the Commission emphasized certain factors in the Release as a
warning to all registrants. Perhaps the most far reaching aspect of Caterpillar
is the Commission's conclusion in a footnote that "Caterpillar did not have
adequate procedures in place designed to ensure compliance with the MD&A
requirements." 5 8 Therefore, in the future, registrants are advised to adopt
comprehensive procedures to govern the drafting and review of their MD&A.
Registrants may look to the MD&A standards of other firms within its
155. Id.
156. Id. at 63,056.
157. See generally Harvey L. Pitt, et al., MD&A Through the Eyes of Management: A Closer
Look at the SEC's Caterpillar Decision in Directors' and Officers' Liability 1933: A Satellite
Program (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4424 1992) (closely
analyzing the Caterpillar decision).
158. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, supra note 9, at 63,055 n.8.
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industry; but, whatever procedures are ultimately employed should be tailored
to fit the nature of the registrant's business. Additionally, persons knowledge-
able in the nuances and intricacies of securities law should design the
registrant's framework for MD&A disclosure. The registrant's attorneys,
management, and outside auditors should be involved in the actual drafting and
reviewing of the MD&A disclosure language prior to board approval.
However, the Commission has warned registrants, "[a]lthough an auditor or
other third party [legal counsel] may review the MD&A section of a periodic
report, the substance of the S-K Item 303 disclosure is the responsibility of
management."' 59 Thus, senior management and the board must carefully
review and accept full responsibility for the registrant's MD&A. 1
The Caterpillar decision was unique because it represented the first time
the Commission used its new cease and desist powers. Utilizing this new tool,
the Commission could draft a didactic opinion and order which offered
meaningful guidance to registrants as to the Commission's interpretation of the
MD&A disclosure requirements.
The Commission accepted Caterpillar's Offer of Settlement in which
Caterpillar agreed to voluntarily "implement and maintain procedures designed
to ensure compliance with the MD&A requirements."' However, Caterpil-
lar had not been the subject of any prior SEC actions nor did it admit to any
wrongdoing in the Offer of Settlement." It is unclear what role Cater-
pillar's record played in the Commission's decision to utilize its new cease and
desist power rather than to use its traditional remedies.
Like a fist in a velvet glove, Caterpillar is a message case. The
Caterpillar Release reflects the Commission's belief in the importance of
proper MD&A disclosure. 63 One can draw a strong inference that the
Commission intends to subject future periodic filings to more rigorous review
and where appropriate to institute administrative proceedings that advance
MD&A's objective of allowing investors and other users to view the registrant
"through the eyes of management." Moreover, recalcitrant registrants that fail
to heed the admonitions of the Commission face the more formidable
159. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, supra note 9, at 63,054 n.6.
160. See id. at 63,052. Interestingly, in Caterpillar, the MD&A was found to be inadequate
even where the controller, treasurer, financial vice president, senior executive, legal counsel, the
pubic affairs and economics departments, and the board had scrutinized and deliberated the
propriety of the MD&A. Presumably, the error was in the quality, not the quantity of review.
Id.
161. Exchange Act Release No. 30,523, supra note 9, at 63,056 (March 31, 1992).
162. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, supra note 9, at 63,050-51, 63,056.
163. Ironically, the stature of Caterpillar as a well-respected public company may have been
a motivating factor in the Commission's decision to institute administrative proceedings against
it. By so doing, the Commission sent the message that no registrant, no matter how sophisticated
and well respected, is beyond its reach when the registrant's disclosure is inadequate.
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C. Fraud-On-The-Market Theory and Inaccurate Prospective Disclosure
Many commentators have attempted to draw an analogy between
Caterpillar and an earlier case, Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co."6 In
Wielgos the Commonwealth Edison Company (CEC) made inaccurate forward-
looking statements regarding the cost estimates to complete several nuclear
reactors." 6 The plaintiff argued that CEC should be denied the protection
of the Rule 175 safe-harbor because CEC's statements were made without a
reasonable basis.'66 In rejecting such an argument, Judge Easterbrook noted:
"Forward-looking statements need not be correct; it is enough that they have
a reasonable basis." 67 The court noted the reality that estimates are not
certainties; things never go exactly as predicted. 6 8 Any deviation causes the
future to diverge from the estimate. 69 The Wielgos court then embraced the
fraud-on-the-market theory as the basis for finding that the predictions of CEC
were made in good faith, despite their flaws. 170 The court grounded its
holding on the assumption that the market was sophisticated enough to
discount management's habitually inaccurate cost estimates.'
Caterpillar is distinguishable from Wielgos in at least two respects. First,
Caterpillar was not claiming the benefit of Rule 175. The disclosure at issue
in Caterpillar was not volitional but rather mandatory because Caterpillar
reasonably expected CBSA's performance to have a future impact on its results
of operations and financial condition. Second, and most important, unlike
in Wielgos, the market was unable to discount the forward-looking statements
made by Caterpillar. It was common knowledge that nuclear power plant cost
estimates were typically inaccurate and that Brazil was suffering from
hyperinflation. Nevertheless, it was not public knowledge that CBSA
accounted for twenty-three percent of Caterpillar's profits.
164. 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989).
165. Id. at 512.
166. Id. at 513.
167. Id. Judge Easterbrook further remarked:
Issuers need not "disclose" Murphy's law or the Peter Principle, even though these
have substantial effects on business .... Just as a firm needn't disclose that 50%
of all new products vanish from the market within a short time, so Commonwealth
Edison needn't disclose the hazards of its business, hazards apparent to all serious
observers and most casual ones.
Id. at 515.
168. See 892 F.2d at 515-16.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 516; see also infra note 190 (discussing the fraud-on-the-markettheory).
171. See id.
172. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
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In Wielgos, the registrant used the best information available to it at the
time of disclosure.173 However, in Caterpillar, the registrant continued to
file its SEC periodic reports on a consolidated basis with the knowledge that
CBSA would have a future impact on the company as a whole - a fact not
apparent on the face of the financial statements or in the footnotes thereto.'74
Thus, any attempt to draw an analogy between Caterpillar and Wielgos is
misleading.
D. Other Recent MD&A Litigation
In several other recent cases, courts have strictly construed the MD&A
disclosure requirements and have rejected Rule lOb-5 claims when public
companies allegedly failed to disclose material information in violation of Item
303. For example, in In re Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation,'"
the plaintiffs, stock buyers, argued that Convergent should have disclosed its
internal projections pursuant to Item 303.l6 The Convergent court rejected
that argument, finding that internal projections were forward-looking
statements and as such were expressly excluded from the disclosure require-
ments. 177
In re Sun Microsystems, Inc. Securities Litigation17 raised the question
of a registrant's obligation to disclose in its Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q)
MD&A the potential impact that publicly announced products of competitors
would have on its business. The Sun Microsystems court held that the
disclosure of the future impact of known trends or uncertainties that have had
or that are reasonably expected to have a material impact on the registrant
need only be disclosed in an Annual Report (Form 10-K), but not in a
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q). 1' Quarterly Reports are governed by other
provisions of Item 303 which do not expressly require that such information
be discussed." s The court also found no violation of the general anti-fraud
provisions of the Exchange Act, because there was no MD&A violation that
could give rise to a material misstatement or omission.'
After reviewing the MD&A materiality standard compared to the Basic
probability/magnitude balancing test, the court in Alfus v. Pyramid Technology
173. 892 F.2d 509, 513.
174. Exchange Act Release No. 30,532, supra note 9, at 63,055-56.
175. 948 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1991).
176. Id. at 516 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 303(a)(3)(ii) (1990)).
177. Id. The court based this conclusion on Instruction 7 to Item 303(a). Id.
178. [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,504, at 97,633 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
20, 1990).
179. See id. at 97,637-38.
180. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(b) (1993).
181. In re Sun Microsystems, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 95,504, at 97,637.
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Corp.lr concluded that a "demonstration of a violation of the disclosure
requirements of Item 303 does not lead inevitably to the conclusion that such
disclosure would be required under Rule 10b5. "1 A violation of Item 303
in connection with MD&A, even in an annual report, may not be actionable
under Rule lOb-5 if only the MD&A materiality standard of "reasonably
likely" is shown without the Basic standard." Recall that Rule lOb-5
requires that any misstatement or omission be material before it is action-
able."' In Basic the Supreme Court directed that materiality for purposes
of Rule lOb-5 is to be determined by the probability/magnitude balancing
test."18 In other words, misstatements or omissions in a registrant's MD&A
will violate Item 303 if it is material by reference to the standard of "reason-
ably likely to occur" as announced in Securities Act Release No. 6835.
However, a registrant is not subject to Rule lOb-5 liability for the MD&A
misstatement or omission unless the Basic standard is also established.
The Ayfus court's reasoning is logically inconsistent because it is hard for
one to envision a known trend, demand, commitment, event, or uncertainty
found to be "reasonably likely to occur" so as to be material for purposes of
MD&A that would not also satisfy the "probability" prong of the Basic
balancing test. Likewise, it is difficult to imagine an occurrence that has a
"material effect" for purposes of Item 303 disclosure that would not also
satisfy the "magnitude" prong of the Basic balancing test. Therefore, the
distinction drawn in A/fus is one without a difference.
Consistent with Sun Microsystems and Alfus, the court in In re VeriFone
Securities Litigation"' dismissed a claim for a violation of Rule lOb-5. The
court stated:
Although Item 303 specifies that the corporation is to "[ildentify any
known trends or any known demands, commitments, events or uncertain-
ties," Instruction 7 to Item 303 [also] provides that corporations are
"encouraged, but not required to, supply forward-looking information" and
[that] any forward-looking information so disclosed is protected by the
Rule 175 "safe-harbor.""' 8
182. 764 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
183. Id. at 608.
184. See id. The court relied on SEC Act Release No. 6835 which stated that the probabili-
ty/magnitude test of Basic is inapposite to disclosure under Item 303. See supra note 33 and
accompanying text.
185. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1993).
186. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
187. 784 F. Supp. 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, No. 92-15156, 1993 WL 469265 (9th Cir.
1993).
188. Id. at 1483 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.3039(a)(1) & Instruction 7 (1993)).
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While courts have been rather cryptic in divulging their reasoning
concerning MD&A, the results reached generally appear to be sound.'89
VIII. CONCLUSION
In summary, MD&A is the Commission's attempt to level the playing
field between registrants and the public by mandating that certain information
be shared in an economically efficient manner." It is generally agreed that
"[i]nformation is not a free good." 9' Costs are incurred to generate and
disseminate accurate information,"9 and costs are associated with the
absence of such information."l The Commission's current MD&A policy
attempts to balance these cost considerations; however, its efficacy in
189. See, e.g., Ferber v. The Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698 (D. Conn. 1992); In re
Donald J. Trump Casino Securities Litigation, 793 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 7 F.3d
357 (3rd Cir. 1993); In re VanLandingham, Exchange Act Release No. 23,249, [1982-87 AAER
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,502 (June 20, 1986); In re Francis, Exchange
Act Release No. 23,250, [1982-87 AAER Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,503
(June 20, 1986).
190. Related to the topic of economically efficient dissemination of information is the fraud-on-
the-market theory approved in principal by four justices of the Supreme Court. See Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-50 (1988). This theory maintains that information regarding a
registrant's expected future value is rapidly incorporated into the company's current market price.
The unspoken assumption is that at least a semi-strong, efficient market exists. Under the fraud-
on-the-market-theory, liability is found where material misrepresentations cause a price of
securities to deviate from the efficient market price. Persons who purchase or sell securities
during the period of the deviation and suffer a financial injury are permitted to sue the responsible
party without having to establish any knowledge of the material misrepresentation or omission.
In essence, participants in securities market transaction are assumed to have relied on a market
price free from manipulation. Thus, the fraud-on-the-market theory dispenses with the element
of individual reliance in securities market fraud litigation. See generally Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanism of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984)
(discussing the interrelation of methods of disclosure and degrees of market efficiency); Jonathon
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rsv. 1059 (1990) (analyzing the Court's establishment of the
efficient capital market hypothesis in Basic).
191. In re VeriFone, 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1483 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, No. 92-15156, 1993
WL 469275 (9th Cir. 1993).
192. Id. (citing Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 787-88 (1985)).
193. Id. The social costs to gather and distribute historical information by registrants is
relatively low. From an efficiency standpoint, it makes sense to require registrants to produce
historical information because this information is under their control. Conversely, prospective
information exacts a higher social cost. Not all forecasts, projections, and other prospective
information exists; this information must be created by public companies before it can be
distributed. Even after the information is created, competitive reasons may dictate keeping
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achieving that goal is somewhat suspect. It is noteworthy that historical or
hard information, when properly reported, is rarely the subject of misinterpre-
tation or litigation.' Although most registrants do a fairly good job of
describing historical events, few provide useful and accurate forward-looking
or prospective statements. 95 By their very nature, prospective statements
are subject to the biases of management. 96 Too often, these statements are
both self-serving and overly optimistic. Thus, when prospective information
is disclosed, registrants tend to predict correctly positive occurrences, either
ignoring or not fully disclosing negative ones.'97
Notwithstanding the market's ability to discount predictive informa-
tion, 9 ' it might be best to impose upon public companies the obligation to
disclose hard information and leave the pure speculation to others."9 This
is not to suggest that all prognostication by public companies is, or should be,
prohibited. On the contrary, the federal securities laws appropriately
encourage forward-looking disclosure; a safe harbor from liability is provided
in Rule 175.1 To the public, an accurate good faith prediction made on a
reasonable basis is valuable information which can be carefully considered and
given its proper weight.
Attempting to improve compliance with MD&A, many public companies
are adopting the strategy of disclosing unanticipated events instead of
remaining silent even in the absence of a disclosure trigger. Even today, it is
not uncommon for a registrant to collect and analyze the contents of the
MD&A disclosure statements of similarly situated companies as a means of
improving its own compliance. Additionally, many companies are establishing
a board committee to oversee the entire MD&A disclosure process, while
others are beginning to institute written policies and procedure for the
194. See In re Verifone, 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1483 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, No. 92-15156,
1993 WL 469265 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook& Daniel-R. Fischel, Mandatory
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 674 (1984)).
195. See Moses L. Pava & Marc J. Epstein, How Good Is MD&A As An Investment Tool?,
J. Accr. (March 1993) at 51, 51-52. The authors discovered that many public companies made
no prediction whatsoever. Id. Only 12% accurately anticipated all economic events (labor
conflicts, new competition, etc.) cited by Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks. Id. at 52.
Public companies as a group were more than twice as likely to correctly predict positive
economic events than negative events. Further, on average, registrants were more successful at
predicting company-specific events than industry-wide or economy-specific events. Id.
196. Roger J. Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management Projections:A Law and
Economics Perspective, 46 MD. L. REv. 1197, 1211-18 (1987).
197. Id.
198. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir. 1989).
199. In re VeriFone Securities Litigation, 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1482 (N.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd,
No. 92-15156, 1993 WL 469275 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 194,
at 703).
200. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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gathering, processing, and reviewing function involved in the preparation of
their MD&As. Perhaps one of the most intriguing developments is that
registrants and their legal counsel are compelled to engage in a due diligence
review of MD&A disclosure much in the same manner as a registration
statement is reviewed by underwriters and legal counsel.
As to the future of MD&A, public companies will most likely see a
further gradual tightening of the federal securities laws governing disclosure,
thereby limiting their ability to exercise discretion in making selective
disclosure, to withhold potentially damaging information, and to make
optimistic statements about the company's future. Although the increasing
complexity of MD&A coupled with the ever present threat of an SEC
proceeding or other litigation will continue to produce anxiety among many
registrants, the public may benefit from the more forthright disclosure MD&A
now compels.
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